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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In the post-constitutional era from 1994 onward1 South African 
courts were called to adjudicate upon a number of challenges to 
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testamentary charitable trusts that contained directives based on race, 
gender and religion in regard to the bestowal of trust benefits.  In 
deciding these matters, courts had to weigh testators’ personal autonomy 
through the exercise of freedom of testation against constitutional and 
public policy imperatives on equality and non-discrimination.  Where 
constitutional and public policy prescripts were found to outweigh 
testamentary freedom, courts cured the violation of the equality rights of 
those excluded from trust benefits through apposite remedies. 
 In this Article I assess critically South African courts’ treatment of 
discriminatory testamentary bequests against constitutionally founded 
public policy prescripts, on the one hand, and the demands occasioned by 
adherence to testators’ freedom of testation, on the other.  To this end, I 
typify as discriminatory all bequests that, in the words of Harding,2 “pick 
out elements of the identity” of testamentary beneficiaries as well as 
those excluded from testamentary benefit and on which the unfavourable 
treatment of such beneficiaries or excluded persons are based.  South 
African jurisprudence on the matter reveals that race, gender and religion 
are the foremost elements of identity utilized by testators to mete out 
unfavourable treatment. 
 The inquiry focuses on the mixed nature of South Africa’s common 
law that is Civilian in origin but is infused with elements of the English 
Common Law.  I investigate how South African courts’ treatment of 
discriminatory testamentary bequests, both in the pre-constitutional and 
post-constitutional eras, adheres to the tenets of Roman-Dutch law (as 
South Africa’s common law to this day) and, moreover, how such 
treatment is aligned to corresponding tendencies in Common Law 
jurisdictions.  In particular, I distinguish the firm normative approach to 
discriminatory testamentary bequests advocated by some Common Law 
scholars, on the one hand, from, on the other, the emphasis that some 
Civilian scholars place on subjective considerations such as testamentary 
intent, motive or purpose to provide balance to the objectivity of a strictly 
normative inquiry.  I test the normative stance that South African courts 
assumed towards discriminatory testamentary bequests in the post-
constitutional years against these views propounded in Common Law 
and Civil Law scholarship, and I argue that the position taken by South 
African courts regarding the distinction between fair and unfair 
                                                                                                                  
 1. South Africa’s interim Constitution, enacted after the fall of apartheid, came into force 
on 27 April 1994 and its final Constitution was signed into law on 10 December 1996 and came 
into force on 4 February 1997. 
 2. Matthew Harding, Some Arguments Against Discriminatory Gifts and Trusts, 31 
OJLS 303, 322 (2011). 
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discrimination is significant for the purpose of adjudicating on the 
tenability of such bequests. 
II. THE COMMON LAW:  A NORMATIVE APPROACH 
 The Common Law traditionally regards discriminatory 
testamentary bequests, including those devised along racial, gender and 
religious lines, with considerable tolerance.  In the well-known English 
case of Blathwayt v. Baron Cawley 3 the House of Lords could not be 
persuaded to invalidate a forfeiture clause that provided for the 
relinquishment of estates under a testamentary settlement if the estate 
holders became Roman Catholics.  Similarly, in University of Victoria v. 
British Columbia (Ministry of the Attorney General)4 the British 
Columbia Supreme Court ruled that a testamentary bursary bequest to 
Roman Catholic students at the petitioner university was valid and 
administrable in accordance with the will’s directives.  And in Trustees of 
Church Property of the Diocese of Newcastle v. Ebbeck 5 the Australian 
High Court opined that a testator “may . . . provide that his property shall 
go only to persons of a particular religion” and that “a prospective 
beneficiary will be disqualified unless he renounce a particular faith.”6 
 This tolerant approach notwithstanding, the Common Law permits 
interference in bequests that may be labelled discriminatory in nature.  To 
this end two tools are utilized; first, the strict requirement regarding 
certainty of conditions attaching to testamentary dispositions and, 
secondly, the public policy yardstick.7  In regard to the former, the House 
of Lords determined in the leading English case of Clavering v. Ellison8 
that a condition subsequent must evince a high degree of precision to 
meet the certainty requirement.  In Clayton v. Ramsden 9 the House of 
Lords, following Clavering v. Ellison, struck down for uncertainty a 
condition subsequent that purported to effect the forfeiture of interests 
under testamentary trusts if the trust beneficiary married a person not of 
Jewish parentage and of the Jewish faith. 
 The second tool, public policy, is used readily in Common Law 
jurisdictions to adjudicate the tenability of potentially discriminatory 
testamentary bequests that meet the certainty requirement.  However, 
                                                 
 3. [1976] AC 397 (HL). 
 4. (2000) 185 DLR (4th) 182. 
 5. [1960] 104 CLR 394. 
 6. Id. at 414. 
 7. Harding, supra note 2, at 308, 310. 
 8. [1859] 7 HL Cas 707. 
 9. [1943] AC 320 (HL). 
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courts in these jurisdictions generally refrain from invalidating altogether 
such bequests; rather they choose to refashion the devolution of benefits 
under these bequests.  This is the case particularly regarding testamentary 
charitable trusts that restrict trust benefits on racial, gender and religious 
grounds.  To this end courts in Common Law jurisdictions make ample 
use of the cy-près doctrine in instances where the restrictions imposed 
occasion impracticability or impossibility of charitable purposes.  In Re 
Lysaght; Hill v. Royal College of Surgeons of England10 the Chancery 
Division, despite not labelling the offending condition in violation of 
public policy, ordered a cy-près scheme that excised from a testatrix’s 
will a restriction that excluded students of the Jewish or Roman Catholic 
faiths from scholarships at the Royal College of Surgeons.11  On the other 
hand, the Ontario Court of Appeal, in Re Canada Trust Co. v. Ontario 
(Human Rights Commission),12 found that an inter vivos educational 
trust violated public policy insofar as it limited recipients of scholarships 
to, among others, “a British Subject of the White Race and of the 
Christian Religion in its Protestant form.” The discrimination evident 
from the indenture creating this trust was of a particularly bigoted variety 
insofar as it contained a number of recitals that related to, among others, 
the race, religion, ethnic origin and colour of the class of persons eligible 
to receive scholarships.  It proclaimed, among other things, that “the 
Settlor believes that the White Race is, as a whole, best qualified by 
nature to be entrusted with the development of civilization and the 
general progress of the World along the best lines” and that “the Settlor 
believes that the progress of the World depends in the future, as in the 
past, on the maintenance of the Christian religion.”13  The court, having 
ruled that the discriminatory restrictions violate public policy, decided on 
refashioning the trust by relieving it of such restrictions.  The court 
consequently applied the cy-près doctrine to strike out all restrictions 
regarding race, ethnic origin, gender and religion in respect of those 
entitled to the benefits of the trust.14  Significantly, the court in Canada 
Trust applied contemporary public policy notions in arriving at its 
                                                 
 10. [1966] Ch 191. 
 11. See also the earlier case of Re Dominion Students’ Hall Trust; Dominion Students’ 
Hall Trust v. Attorney General [1947] Ch 183 and the more recent judgment in Re Harding; 
Gibbs v. Harding [2007] EWHC 3 (Ch). 
 12. (1990) 69 DLR (4th) 321. 
 13. Id. at 326. 
 14. It is noteworthy that the utilization of the cy-près doctrine to change the devolution of 
benefits under (potentially) discriminatory trusts is not without its critics:  cf., e.g., John K. 
Eason, Motive, Duty, and the Management of Restricted Charitable Gifts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 123 (2010). 
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decision, not the public policy that prevailed at the time of the trust’s 
creation some seven decades earlier. 
 Trusts such as those in the Lysaght and Canada Trust cases exhibit a 
distinct “public” character because, although privately created, they are 
directed at educational institutions that receive government funding and 
draw their student populations from the public at large.  Common Law 
jurisprudence reveals sensitivity for the public-private-divide in regard to 
such trusts.  In Canada Trust, for example, Tarnopolsky JA opined that 
the court’s decision in casu “does not affect private, family trusts” 
because “[i]t is this public nature of charitable trusts which attracts the 
requirement that they conform to the public policy against 
discrimination” and “[o]nly where the trust is a public one devoted to 
charity will restrictions that are contrary to the public policy of equality 
render it void.”15 
 The public-private-divide in respect of, on the one hand, charitable 
trusts and gifts and, on the other, private, non-charitable dispositions 
features pertinently in the United States of America where federal and 
state constitutional and statutory provisions as well as the state action 
issues usually associated therewith come into play.  For example, Evans 
v. Newton16 concerned a testamentary bequest of land to a city in Georgia 
for “a park and pleasure ground” for whites only.  The Georgia court of 
first instance accepted the city’s resignation as trustee and appointed 
three individual trustees.17  The Supreme Court of Georgia, in its majority 
judgment, opined that the park’s status as a public facility was “not 
dissipated ipso facto by the appointment of ‘private’ trustees”18 and, 
moreover, that, because “mass recreation through the use of parks is 
plainly in the public domain . . . state courts that aid private parties to 
perform that public function on a segregated basis implicate the State in 
conduct proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”19  The Supreme 
Court consequently held the bequest to be unconstitutional and reversed 
the judgment of the trial court.20  The Evans judgments, in addition to 
affirming the division between the public and private spheres, place into 
                                                 
 15. (1990) 69 DLR (4th) at 353. 
 16. 382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
 17. Id. at 297-98. 
 18. Id. at 301. 
 19. Id. at 302. 
 20. Id.  In Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), the United States Supreme Court 
rejected a prayer to strike the aforementioned racial restriction from the testator’s will under the 
cy-près doctrine and affirmed the Georgia trial court’s and Georgia Supreme Court’s ruling that, 
because the sole purpose of the trust to establish a whites-only park was, according to the 
judgment in Evans v. Newton, unconstitutional, the trust had in fact failed, causing the trust 
property to revert to the testator’s heirs. 
 
 
 
 
102 TULANE EUROPEAN & CIVIL LAW FORUM [Vol. 27 
 
sharp focus the role of courts as public authorities through which legal 
subjects wish to have privately created legal acts enforced. 
 Is the public-private-divide as outlined above a tenable one and, if 
not; to what extent ought public policy, manifestly as an objective, non-
discrimination norm, to negate testators’ freedom to discriminate in 
purely private bequests?  Common Law scholarship yields interesting 
and wide-ranging views on this intriguing matter. 
 At the one end of the spectrum the Weinribs,21 in their discussion of 
the Canada Trust case, argue against the operation of a non-
discrimination norm to quash private autonomy in the law of gifts and 
trusts.  The Weinribs advocate the principle of “transactional equality” 
which militates against acknowledging the normative position of only 
one party in an essentially private dispute on parties’ rights and 
obligations.22  The consideration that every disponor is free to choose the 
terms and conditions of a disposition of property is central to the 
Weinribs’ argument.23  The opposite end of the spectrum is occupied by 
those who call for the elimination of all discrimination from gifts and 
trusts.  Harding24 opines that courts, as public institutions, must always be 
sensitive to applicable public policy and/or constitutional norms, even 
when adjudicating a purely private matter.  He contests the Weinribs’ 
argument that the state impermissibly violates personal autonomy when 
it refuses to facilitate privately created dispositions, even when such 
dispositions are not imbued with a public character of any kind.  Harding 
opines that the non-discrimination norm affects all gifts and trusts, even 
those that discriminate in pursuit of a valuable goal: 
In a community characterized by pluralism, the collective good of a public 
culture of respect for, and pride in, identity is potentially undermined in any 
case where a person brings about unfavourable treatment of others on 
grounds that, in one way or another, explicitly pick out elements of the 
identity of those others.  Moreover, the likelihood of this collective good 
being undermined increases when the state, through law, vindicates such 
discriminatory treatment on the part of individuals by enabling that 
treatment to take effect.25 
                                                 
 21. Lorraine E. Weinrib & Ernest J. Weinrib, Constitutional Values and Private Law in 
Canada, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW 43 (Daniel Friedman & Daphne Barak-Erez eds., 
2001). 
 22. Id. at 48-49, 56. 
 23. Id. at 67-68. 
 24. Harding, supra note 2, at 318. 
 25. Id. at 322-23. 
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 Grattan and Conway26 also support this approach in their criticism 
of Canada Trust.  They argue that, in jurisdictions with constitutional 
dispensations, the public policy doctrine channels constitutional 
protections into the entire realm of private law; there is not a more 
exclusive personal sphere within the private law domain that is immune 
from public policy arguments and associated judicial interference.  
Grattan and Conway opine, therefore, that public policy can be invoked 
to override all private dispositions without the need for some public 
“anchor”—such as the public domain in respect of educational trusts—to 
be applied. 
 Between these opposing views a range of standpoints, particularly 
by American commentators, seek to establish a middle ground.  Henry27 
discusses the judgments on a so-called “Jewish clause” that required 
beneficiaries to marry a spouse of the Jewish faith or someone who 
converted to Judaism within one year of marriage in In re Estate of 
Feinberg28 and welcomes the strong judicial preference for testamentary 
freedom evident from the Illinois Supreme Court’s judgment in casu.  
Henry notes as significant that the provision in the Feinberg will was not 
punitive in nature and was clearly an expression of the testators’ deeply 
held religious beliefs.29  Henry supports judicial interference in 
testamentary bequests only where a disposition is “punitive in nature or 
motivated by an interest in furthering a prejudicial, bigoted, or 
malevolent agenda”30—the educational trust in the Canada Trust case 
clearly falls into this ignominious category.  On the other hand, Colliton31 
argues that particularly race and gender-based trusts, even those with 
private individuals as trustees, are invalid and should not be enforced 
under the American common law of trusts because, among other reasons, 
they offend contemporary public policy prescripts.  In support of this 
proposition, Colliton places particular reliance on the majority judgment 
in Bob Jones University v. United States,32 a case that addressed the 
question whether an educational institution that practiced racially 
discriminatory admission and other policies was exempt from federal 
                                                 
 26. Sheena Grattan & Heather Conway, Testamentary Conditions in Restraint of Religion 
in the Twenty-First Century:  An Anglo-Canadian Perspective, 50 MCGILL L.J. 511, 531 (2005). 
 27. Orly Henry, If You Will It, It Is No Dream:  Balancing Public Policy and Testamentary 
Freedom, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 215 (2011). 
 28. 919 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 2009). 
 29. Henry, supra note 27, at 233. 
 30. Id. at 234. 
 31. James W. Colliton, Race and Sex Discrimination in Charitable Trusts, 12 CORNELL 
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 275, 292 (2003). 
 32. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
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income taxation.  The Supreme Court reasoned, on the basis of the 
common law of trusts, that the university was not charitable and, hence, 
did not qualify for tax exemption and other benefits afforded charitable 
institutions.33  The court stated: 
We are bound to approach these questions with full awareness that 
determination of public benefit and public policy are sensitive matters with 
serious implications for the institutions affected; a declaration that a given 
institution is not “charitable” should be made only where there can be no 
doubt that the activity involved is contrary to a fundamental public policy.  
But there can no longer be any doubt that racial discrimination in education 
violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary justice.34 
 In light of the Bob Jones University judgment, Colliton proposes 
that trusts that discriminate against blacks and other minority racial 
groups are contrary to public policy and not enforceable as charitable 
trusts.35  He concedes, however, that trusts discriminating in favour of 
traditionally disadvantaged groups may be justifiable as attempts to 
address past discrimination or to correct economic or opportunity 
imbalances.36  Colliton consequently advises that decisions on whether a 
particular trust violates public policy must necessarily be taken on a case-
by-case basis.37  While such a casuistic approach is, practically speaking, 
often unavoidable, Elmore38 warns that a case-by-case determination of 
how public policy might affect an individual situation may yield 
inconsistency from which it is difficult to distil a principled solution to 
policy-based challenges to testamentary bequests.  He, therefore, 
advocates that a court must determine public policy by making logical 
and proper inferences from statute law and legal precedent.39  
Correspondingly, Grattan and Conway40 note as significant the Canada 
Trust court’s affirmation that public policy is infused by equality 
directives such as those contained in the Canadian Human Rights Code 
1981, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms included in the 
Constitution Act 1982 and, for purposes of the United Kingdom, the 
Human Rights Act 1998.  Harding41 also emphasizes the importance of 
                                                 
 33. Id. at 595. 
 34. Id. at 592. 
 35. Colliton, supra note 31, at 297. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 298. 
 38. Christopher T. Elmore, Public Policy or Political Correctness:  Addressing the 
Dilemma of Applying Public Policy to Inheritance Issues, 2 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 
199, 203 (2009). 
 39. Id. at 223. 
 40. Grattan & Conway, supra note 26, at 531. 
 41. Harding, supra note 2, at 311. 
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the Human Rights Act insofar as it imported provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights into England’s domestic law and increased 
the likelihood that the norms entrenched in the Convention will 
influence, through some form of horizontal effect, the development of 
the English common law on the issue of discriminatory testamentary 
bequests. 
 The above synopsis shows that discriminatory testamentary 
bequests elicit wide-ranging and, at times, conflicting reactions from 
courts and commentators in Common Law jurisdictions.  Nevertheless, 
there is by and large unanimity that public policy can be invoked 
normatively to limit testators’ freedom to have discriminatory dispository 
plans effected; the burning issue remains the extent to which the non-
discrimination norm limits testamentary freedom, particularly in purely 
private bequests.  Judicial precedent can undoubtedly aid an inquiry into 
the matter.  The concretization of public policy in state and national 
constitutions and human rights statutes in Common Law jurisdictions 
lends a definitive objectivity to the normative inquiry. 
III. CIVIL LAW:  ROOM FOR SOME SUBJECTIVITY—THE DUTCH 
POSITION 
 Continental European civil codes generally contain prescripts that 
invalidate testamentary bequests, particularly conditions, which violate 
the public order or good morals.42  The test in this regard is by and large 
objective in nature:  will the average, reasonable person regard the 
contested bequest as contravening good morality?43  The new Dutch Civil 
Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek), of which Book 4 on inheritance law 
commenced on 1 January 2003, permits explicitly a subjective element—
that of the motive underlying a testamentary bequest—in the inquiry into 
the effect of contravention of the public order and/or morality on a 
bequest’s validity.  Article 4:44 of the Code determines that a will or 
testamentary bequest is void if its content is contrary to the public order 
or good morals; moreover that a will or testamentary bequest is void if 
the decisive motive for making the will or bequest is contrary to the 
public order or good morals, provided such motive is evident from the 
                                                 
 42. E.g., art. 900 of the French Civil Code (Code Civil); par. 138 of the German Civil 
Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch); art. 900 of the Belgian Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek ) .  The 
good morals function by and large as a Civilian equivalent to the Common Law’s public policy 
yardstick. 
 43. E.g., in German law the evaluation occurs in terms of the “Anschauung des 
anständingen Durchschnittmenschen ”  (the opinion of the decent average person):  see CARSTEN 
THOMAS EBENROTH, ERBRECHT 199-200 (1992). 
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will itself.  Article 4:45 stipulates in similar vein that where a condition 
or testamentary obligation imposed by will is contrary to, among others, 
the public order or good morals, the condition or obligation is deemed 
not to have been written.  Such condition or obligation does not, however, 
invalidate the entire bequest to which it is attached, unless it constitutes 
the decisive motive of the testator for making the bequest. 
 Article 4:44 was the subject of a recent decision by the Court ‘s-
Hertogenbosch.44  In casu a testatrix instituted one of her sons, with 
express reference to his gender, as only heir.  This bequest was contested 
on the ground that the exclusion of the testatrix’s other children from 
their legitimate portions contravened the public order and good morals by 
reason of the testatrix’s motivation to afford her heir “more elbowroom in 
life” and, moreover, that she deemed as negligible the other children’s 
interests in the inheritance.  The court opined that the testatrix’s 
motivation for instituting the son as sole heir does not contravene the 
public order or good morals;45 moreover, that article 4:44 can be invoked 
only in exceptional circumstances where testamentary direction militate 
against the fundamental notions of unwritten law.  As testamentary 
encroachment on the legitimate portion has never been regarded as 
contravening the public order or good morals in the Netherlands, the 
will’s contestants could not invoke successfully article 4:44 before the 
Court ‘s-Hertogenbosch.46 
 A comparison between the approach of the court in casu and the 
model proposed by Harding for the elimination of all discrimination 
from gifts and trusts in Common Law jurisdictions reveals the 
complicated nature of applying public policy to testamentary bequests.  
Harding,47 building on the premise that identity-based bequests 
undermine a community’s collective good, argues that a public culture of 
respect for identity is not endangered where discriminatory treatment is 
known to be discriminatory by only the person meting it out.  So, if a 
testator has a son, Paul, and a daughter, Jenny, and leaves his property 
only to Paul because he believes that women are ill-equipped to manage 
property, Harding advocates that the bequest should stand notwith-
standing the fact that it is motivated by a desire on the testator’s part to 
discriminate against his daughter on the ground of gender.48  However, 
                                                 
 44. 29 November 2011, LJN BU6438, available at www.rechtspraak.nl (last visited 28 
Dec. 2011). 
 45. Id. § 4.9.1. 
 46. Id. § 4.9.2. 
 47. Harding, supra note 2, at 323. 
 48. Id. 
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should the testator leave his inheritance expressly to “my male 
descendant,” Harding argues that, because the discriminatory nature of 
the disposition has been made explicit, the disposition should be 
invalidated.49  This is so even where the disposition is not intended as 
manipulative in that the testator attempts to rule from the grave.50 
 Harding’s model is clearly at odds with the position taken by the 
Court ‘s-Hertogenbosch in the above judgment insofar as it ruled that the 
gender-exclusive appointment of an heir did not invalidate the bequest on 
policy grounds.  However, there is (qualified) support for Harding’s view 
in Civil Law scholarship.  For example, the Dutch writer Rutten51 
proposes that, should a testator be moved to make a particular 
testamentary disposition, and even state such explicitly in the will, by 
reason of religious convictions, no improper motive is present; should the 
same testator, however, benefit his son to the exclusion of his daughter 
without good reason or should he exclude his spouse from an inheritance 
because she is not a Muslim, an improper motive is present and the 
bequest will fall foul of article 4:44 of the Dutch Civil Code.  Rutten’s 
view is criticized by Kolkman52 who relies on a dissenting opinion in the 
European Court of Human Rights’ judgment in Pla & Puncernau v. 
Andorra53 that “what is prohibited for the State need not necessarily also 
be prohibited for individuals,” and argues that Rutten’s distinction 
between motive based on conviction (which Rutten deems unacceptable), 
on the one hand, and religious conviction (which Rutten deems 
acceptable), on the other, is untenable.  Kolkman favours, in light of the 
aforementioned dissenting opinion in the Pla case, a dispensation in 
which individuals enjoy greater freedom to arrange their private affairs in 
accordance with their personally held convictions, whether religious or 
otherwise, even if the outcome of such arrangements would amount to 
impermissible discrimination if perpetrated by a state. 
 Interestingly, Pla, in which the European Court of Human Rights 
ruled that the Andorran High Court breached the European Convention 
on Human Rights when it decided to uphold a testamentary settlement 
that discriminated against adopted children, is regarded by Harding54 as 
                                                 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 324. 
 51. S.W.E. Rutten, SHARIA-testamenten, 6705 W.P.N.R 305, 311 (2007). 
 52. Wilbert D. Kolkman, Who, Then, in Law, Is My Son—Over Family Life, Uitleg en de 
Lange Arm uit Straatsburg, in MARKANTE ANALYSES:  OPSTELLEN AANGEBODEN AAN MARK 
WISSINK OP 17 DECEMBER 74-75 (Grietje de Jong, Lineke Klap, Bart Krans & Fokko Oldenhuis 
eds., 2009). 
 53. (App. No. 69498/01) (2006) 42 EHRR 25. 
 54. Harding, supra note 2, at 314. 
 
 
 
 
108 TULANE EUROPEAN & CIVIL LAW FORUM [Vol. 27 
 
instructive to English courts in developing England’s common law to 
eliminate all discrimination from gifts and trusts; Kolkman,55 on the other 
hand, criticizes the majority opinion in Pla on the ground that the 
European Convention on Human Rights is typified by the “black letter 
approach” so common in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions—an approach that, 
according to Kolkman, does not pay due regard to intention, reasonable 
expectations and other subjective elements that are frequently decisive to 
testamentary bequests.  The view of Luijten and Meijer56 corresponds 
with the latter opinion and also affirms a case-by-case approach to the 
matter: 
It has to be decided in each particular case whether the bequest endangers 
the personal freedom of choice of the beneficiary.  One must have regard to 
the intention of the testator.  The same testamentary condition can often be 
intended as either immoral or not immoral, for example the condition not 
to marry or not to remarry.  In practice it will often be difficult to discover 
such intention; in our opinion a benign intention on the testator’s part will 
then have to be assumed.57 
 Finally, it is noteworthy that testamentary dispositions that conflict 
with the public order or good morals as well as bequests where the 
testator’s decisive motive contravenes the public order or good morals are 
fairly rare in modern Dutch wills.  This low incidence is ascribable to the 
pivotal role played by the Civil Law notary in the Netherlands.58  Article 
21(2) of the Dutch Notaries Act (Wet op het notarisambt) obliges a Dutch 
notary to refuse service, among others, when, according to his reasonable 
conviction, the service which he is required to provide would contravene 
the law or the public order, or when his assistance is required in respect 
of an act that apparently will have an unlawful purpose or consequence.  
Notaries, therefore, will caution testators against including discrimina-
tory or potentially discriminatory provisions in wills; if a testator is 
nevertheless insistent, the notary will simply withhold service and the 
will will not be executed.59  Of course, estate lawyers in Common Law 
jurisdictions face a similar challenge.  Cundiff and Copans,60 in their 
discussion of the earlier-mentioned Feinberg case, caution that the 
prudent adviser, although not under any statutory obligation to withhold 
services akin to that of the Dutch notary, should devise devolutionary 
                                                 
 55. Kolkman, supra note 52, at 70. 
 56. E.A.A. LUIJTEN & W.R. MEIJER, HUWELIJKSGOEDEREN- EN ERFRECHT (12th ed. 2008) 
 57. Id. at 201 (my translation from the original Dutch). 
 58. Kolkman, supra note 52, at 74. 
 59. Id. 
 60. James H. Cundiff & Andrew D. Copans, In Re Estate of Feinberg:  When Legal Fees 
Consume an Estate—Restrictive Clauses are Moot, 35 ACTEC L.J. 255, 263 (2009). 
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schemes that will ensure the implementation of restrictive testamentary 
provisions in a manner that avoids potential invalidity (or, it should be 
added, the potential for judicial refashioning of such provisions) based on 
public policy concerns. 
 The above synopsis shows that in a Civil Law jurisdiction such as 
the Netherlands scholarly opinion on the tenability of discriminatory 
testamentary bequests differs just as in Common Law jurisdictions.  
Although the approach to such bequests is  normative, the Dutch Civil 
Code’s and Dutch scholars’ explicit emphasis on the subjective 
considerations of testamentary intent, motive or purpose is significant 
insofar as it establishes, potentially at least, some counter-balance to the 
rigidity that could result from a firm objective, normative approach to 
public policy issues in inheritance law. 
IV. A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 
 The South African legal system, like those of, among others, 
Scotland, Louisiana and Quebec, is mixed or hybrid in nature.  Roman-
Dutch law, the legal system developed in the Netherlands through the 
reception, particularly in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, of Roman 
law and its synthesis with Germanic customary law, feudal law and 
canon law, was introduced at the Cape of Good Hope (present-day Cape 
Town) by Dutch settlers from the middle of the seventeenth century.  
Roman-Dutch law remains South Africa’s common law to this day; 
however, by reason of judicial and legislative adaptation and 
development, no longer in its pure form.  Roman-Dutch law coalesced 
with English law in the aftermath of the second British occupation of the 
Cape in 1806—the new English rulers retained Roman-Dutch law as the 
law of the Cape, but English legal influence on the existing Civilian legal 
system was unavoidable and a number of typically Common Law legal 
institutions and statutory constructions soon featured in the law of the 
Cape.61  The trust, the focus of recent South African judgments on 
discriminatory testamentary bequests, was one such legal institution 
introduced at the Cape—notwithstanding Roman-Dutch law’s 
unfamiliarity with the trust, English settlers continued the (to them) 
familiar usage of the trust in testamentary bequests, deeds of gift, ante-
                                                 
 61. For a concise overview of the development of South Africa’s common law and its 
mixed legal system, see A.B. EDWARDS, THE HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW—AN OUTLINE 
(1996); Reinhard Zimmermann & Daniel Visser, Introduction:  South African Law as a Mixed 
Legal System, in SOUTHERN CROSS:  CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 2 (R. 
Zimmermann & D. Visser eds., 1996). 
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nuptial contracts and land transfers.62  As white settlers moved to the 
central and northern South African interior the mixed legal system of the 
Cape, with its trust law component, spread throughout what became 
modern-day South Africa. 
A. Freedom of Testation and Constitutionalism 
 Freedom of testation was a highly regarded manifestation of private 
autonomy in Roman law (where will-making negated the “misfortune” of 
intestacy)63 and was, as such, received into Roman-Dutch law64 from 
where it established itself, bolstered by the corresponding position in 
English law,65 as one of the fundamental premises upon which the 
modern South African law of testate succession operates.66  The maxim 
voluntas testatoris servanda est—denoting that a testator’s last wishes as 
minuted in a will must be carried out—forms part of South African law;67 
consequently South African courts enjoy no general jurisdiction to 
authorize a variation of the terms of a will—a so-called “non-variation 
rule” is in effect.68 
 Freedom of testation is, however, not absolute or unfettered.  South 
African law, as indeed most, if not all, jurisdictions that recognise 
freedom of testamentary disposition, imposes a number of limitations on 
testators’ freedom to make testamentary bequests as they see fit.  Some 
such limitations are rooted in the common law,69 whereas others are 
contained in statute.70  The South African common law limitation on 
freedom of testation pertinent to this Article prescribes that effect is not 
given to a testamentary provision that is, in Roman legal phraseology, 
contra bonos mores or, in modern terms, contrary to public policy.71 
                                                 
 62. EDWIN CAMERON, MARIUS J. DE WAAL, BASIL WUNSH, PETER SOLOMON & ELLISON 
KAHN, HONORÉ’S SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF TRUSTS 21 (5th ed. 2002). 
 63. W.W. BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 173 (1928); F. SCHULZ, 
CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 205 (1951). 
 64. R.W. LEE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 352 (4th ed. 1946). 
 65. GARETH MILLER, THE MACHINERY OF SUCCESSION 3-5 (2d ed. 1996). 
 66. M.M. CORBETT, GYS HOFMEYR & ELLISON KAHN, THE LAW OF SUCCESSION IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 39 (2d ed. 2001). 
 67. Robertson v. Robertson’s Executors 1914 AD 503; N.J. VAN DER MERWE & C.J. 
ROWLAND, DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE ERFREG 482 (6th ed. 1990). 
 68. Ex parte Jewish Colonial Trust Ltd.:  In re Estate Nathan 1967 (4) SA 397 (N). 
 69. E.g., a dependent minor child’s maintenance claim against a deceased parent’s estate. 
 70. E.g., an indigent surviving spouse’s maintenance claim against a deceased spouse’s 
estate under the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990. 
 71. Note that South African courts tend to use “boni mores” and “public policy” 
synonymously—an approach that is followed in this Article:  see Minister of Educ. v. Syfrets 
Trust Ltd. 2006 (4) SA 205 (C). 
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 It is noteworthy that South African courts were traditionally open to 
inquiries into testamentary intent, motive or purpose when determining 
whether bequests contravene public policy—precisely the approach 
advocated by Civil lawyers such as Kolkman as well as Luijten and 
Meijer.72  For example, it is settled law, Roman, Roman-Dutch and South 
African, that a testamentary condition is void for violation of public 
policy if it encroaches on the sanctity of marriage through the imposition 
of a general restraint on marriage.73  Nevertheless, should a testator 
provide for periodical payments to his unmarried daughter on condition 
that the payments shall cease if the daughter should marry, it is not the 
testator’s intention to prevent the daughter from entering into marriage 
but only to provide for her financial well-being until she marries.  Some 
South African commentators opine, therefore, that such a condition, 
given the underlying testamentary intent, is valid even though it may 
discourage the daughter from entering into marriage.74  Similarly, South 
African courts have held that a condition or provision in a will which was 
not inserted with the intention or purpose to cause interference in a 
beneficiary’s marital relationship but for some other legal purpose, is 
valid and not in contravention of public policy even though it may have 
the tendency to disrupt the marital relationship.75  These views illustrate 
South African law’s (and courts’) traditional stance to balance, when 
apposite, objective, normative policy demands with subjective 
considerations pertinent to the particular testator in inquiries into the 
limitation of testamentary freedom in terms of public policy. 
 Some of the South African judgments discussed later in this Article 
dealt with a statutory limitation on freedom of testation in terms of 
article 13 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988.  Neither this 
provision nor its treatment by South African courts will be analysed 
comprehensively in this Article, but it deserves mention that it empowers 
a court to vary any trust provision where such provision occasions 
consequences which, in the opinion of the court, the trust founder failed 
to contemplate or foresee (the jurisdictional fact upon which the article’s 
operation depends76), and such provision is, inter alia, in conflict with the 
public interest.  Article 13 of the Trust Property Control Act will be 
                                                 
 72. See Part III above. 
 73. D 28.7.14; D 35.1.22; JOHANNES VOET, COMMENTARIUS AD PANDECTAS 28.7.12 
(1698-1704); SIMON VAN LEEUWEN, CENSURA FORENSIS 1.3.5.29-.30 (1662); Aronson v. Estate 
Hart 1950 (1) SA 539 (A); De Wayer v. SPCA Johannesburg 1963 (1) SA 71 (T). 
 74. D.S.P. CRONJÉ & ANNELIESE ROOS, CASEBOOK ON THE LAW OF SUCCESSION 129 (4th 
ed. 2001). 
 75. Barclays Bank DC&O v. Anderson 1959 (2) SA 478 (T). 
 76. Ex parte BOE Trust Ltd. 2009 (6) SA 470 (WCC) § 20. 
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contextualized briefly later with particular reference to its “public 
interest” criterion. 
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 contains, in 
its Bill of Rights,77 a property clause—article 25—that is said to 
guarantee private ownership and, consequently, an owner’s right to 
dispose freely of property held in private ownership.78  As such 
disposition can occur also by testamentary bequest, South African 
commentators mooted that freedom of testation is implicitly guaranteed 
under the South African Constitution.79  In Ex parte BOE Trust Ltd. the 
court declared: 
Insofar as it may be necessary to seek confirmation that the right to 
freedom of testation remains protected under the Constitution, reference 
may be made to s 25(1) of the 1996 Constitution.  In my opinion, it is clear 
that the right to property includes the right to give enforceable directions as 
to its disposal on the death of the owner.80 
 This unambiguous judicial pronouncement supports the standpoint 
that freedom of testation is indeed constitutionally protected in South 
African law.  Juxtaposed to such autonomy in regard to the exercise of 
private ownership rights, stands the equality and non-discrimination 
directives contained in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights.  The Bill of 
Rights is the cornerstone of democracy in South Africa and enshrines a 
number of rights that affirm the democratic values of human dignity, 
equality and freedom.81  For the purpose of this Article, reference to the 
Bill of Rights’ equality clause82 suffices.  The equality clause dictates that 
everyone is equal before the law, but also authorizes measures designed 
to advance persons or groups of persons that suffered from unfair 
discrimination in the past.  It lists, in article 9(2), the grounds upon which 
the state may not discriminate unfairly against anyone, which grounds 
include race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, religion and 
birth.  The equality clause operates directly horizontally between 
individuals, because its prohibition against unfair discriminatory action 
                                                 
 77. CONST. ch. 2. 
 78. IAIN CURRIE & JOHAN DE WAAL, THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK 538-539 (5th ed. 
2005). 
 79. CORBETT, HOFMEYR & KAHN, supra note 66, at 47; François du Toit, The 
Constitutionally Bound Dead Hand?  The Impact of Constitutional Rights and Principles on 
Freedom of Testation in South African Law, 2 STELL. L. REV. 222, 233-34 (2001). 
 80. Ex parte BOE Trust Ltd. 2009 (6) SA 470 (WCC), § 9.  American law espouses a 
different view—United States courts have held that no one stands possessed of an inherent, 
fundamental, constitutionally guaranteed right to make a will; rather such right is conferred and 
regulated by statute:  see Fullam v. Brock 155 S.E.2d 737, 739 (Sup. Ct. N.C. 1967). 
 81. CONST. art. 7. 
 82. Id. art. 9. 
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extends also to persons inter se.  To this end, article 9(3) of the 
Constitution dictates that no person may discriminate unfairly, either 
directly or indirectly, against anyone on any one or more of the 
aforementioned grounds.  Finally, the equality clause directs that 
discrimination on any one or more of the aforementioned grounds is 
unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is in fact fair.  
Evidently, therefore, the minority view in the European Court of Human 
Rights’ judgment in Pla & Puncernau v. Andorra83 that “what is 
prohibited for the State need not necessarily also be prohibited for 
individuals” does not ring true in the South African context—neither the 
South African state nor persons within its borders may practice unfair 
discrimination in their dealings with (other) persons. 
 It is noteworthy, however, that the Bill of Rights’ limitation clause84 
permits the limitation of rights contained therein by law of general 
application to the extent that such limitation is reasonable and justified in 
an open and democratic society.  Finally, attention must be drawn to 
article 8 of the Constitution that regulates the application of the Bill of 
Rights.  Article 8(1) provides that the Bill of Rights applies to all law, and 
binds the legislator, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.  
Article 8(2) directs that the Bill of Rights is binding on natural and 
juristic persons.  Article 8(3) stipulates that when a court applies a 
provision in the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person, such court 
may, in order to give effect to a right contained in the Bill of Rights, 
develop the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect 
to that right; moreover, such court may develop rules of the common law 
to limit the right, provided that such limitation occurs in accordance with 
the Constitution’s limitation clause.  It is noteworthy, therefore, that 
South African courts are given the express power to develop common 
law rules to give effect to a right enshrined in the Bill of Rights or to 
limit such right when apposite. 
 Commentators acknowledged from the inception of South Africa’s 
democratic constitutional dispensation that some testamentary provisions 
that are discriminatory in nature, yet have been accepted as valid in the 
past, may no longer pass muster in light of the South African 
Constitution’s equality and non-discrimination imperatives.85  One court 
stated emphatically that the only question is which particular bequests 
                                                 
 83. (App. No. 69498/01) (2006) 42 EHRR 25. 
 84. CONST. art. 36. 
 85. CORBETT, HOFMEYR & KAHN, supra note 66, at 134; CAMERON, DE WAAL, WUNSH, 
SOLOMON & KAHN, supra note 62, at 172. 
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will survive judicial scrutiny and which will not.86  Before I attend to this 
important question, I outline, in the section that follows, South African 
courts’ traditional approach to discriminatory testamentary bequests in 
the pre-constitutional era and also the initial move away from the 
traditional approach in the run-up to democratic constitutionalization. 
B. Discriminatory Testamentary Bequests in the Pre-Constitutional 
Era 
 It has been said that South African law “takes the principle of 
freedom of testation further than any other Western legal system.”87  This 
is certainly true of the pre-constitutional era when South African testators 
enjoyed almost unlimited testamentary freedom and courts were 
generally loath to interfere with testamentary bequests that were capable 
of being carried out.  The two tools used in Common Law jurisdictions to 
interfere in discriminatory bequests, although available to South African 
courts, were traditionally utilized very sparingly.  First, the certainty 
requirement in respect of conditions attaching to testamentary 
dispositions is considerably less strict in South African law than in 
English law.  In Aronson v. Estate Hart88 the Appellate Division held that 
a court, when seeking testamentary intent from a will’s  wording, should 
not insist on “the greatest precision” or “the clearest language” but 
should be satisfied if, from the words used, it is “reasonably clear” what 
the testator intended.  Consequently, the court in casu, unlike its English 
counterpart in Clayton v. Ramsden,89 refused to invalidate for uncertainty 
a testamentary condition subsequent that directed the forfeiture of 
testamentary benefits if a beneficiary “should marry a person not born in 
the Jewish faith or forsake the Jewish faith.” 
 Secondly, insofar as South African courts’ traditional use of the 
public policy yardstick is concerned, testators were afforded considerable 
leeway to include discriminatory bequests in wills.  Courts were 
particularly mindful of the subjectivities, manifestly as motive, personal 
inclination, preference, conviction or belief, that often determine the 
content of testamentary dispositions.  In Aronson the Appellate Division 
therefore declined to invalidate the aforementioned forfeiture clause on 
the ground that it contravened public policy.  Greenberg JA90 opined that 
a marriage between “Jew and non-Jew” may well increase the tensions 
                                                 
 86. Minister of Educ. v. Syfrets Trust Ltd. 2006 (4) SA 205 (C), § 12. 
 87. CORBETT, HOFMEYR & KAHN, supra note 66, at 40. 
 88. Aronson v. Estate Hart 1950 (1) SA 539 (A), at 544. 
 89. See Part II above. 
 90. Aronson v. Estate Hart 1950 (1) SA 539 (A), at 546. 
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and stresses ordinarily associated with married life and even lead to 
irreconcilable differences between the spouses; moreover, that the 
children born from such a marriage may be unsettled by such inner 
conflicts “which may leave them rudderless and adrift on the sea of life.” 
The judge remarked that he knows of no principle in law that would 
make it contrary to public policy for a testator-parent to safeguard, 
according to his lights, descendants against such perils.91 
 South African testators traditionally also enjoyed considerable 
freedom in regard to testamentary charitable trusts to limit trust benefits 
on, inter alia, racial, gender and religious grounds.  In South Africa it is 
settled law that a trust established under charitable bequest must evince 
some element of public benefit in order to qualify as a charitable trust.  
The concept “public benefit” was explained in Ex parte Henderson92 to 
not necessarily constitute the conferment of a benefit on the community 
at large; the requisite element of public benefit is present in a bequest 
which is aimed at the advancement of the interests of only a section of or 
group in the community, provided the section or group is sufficiently 
large or representative.  In this regard charitable purposes typically 
include religious and educational purposes as well as the purpose of 
giving aid to or providing for the care and comfort of groups in the 
community such as the aged, infirm, incapacitated and underprivileged 
or the needy.  The providing of assistance to comparatively small but 
distinct groups of people in need thereof may be a charitable purpose, as 
may be the advancement of a small section of the community to a degree 
which is calculated to serve some public interest.93  In this light, the 
advancement of sectional interests under charitable trusts was 
traditionally tolerated under South African law.  So, for example, were a 
trust providing bursaries to students of the University of the 
Witwatersrand, provided that each recipient of a bursary be “a Jew or 
Jewess (not converted)”;94 a trust providing a plot as a “haven of rest for 
tired European missionaries”;95 a trust for the training of “European 
orphaned girls and boys”;96 and a trust for the establishment of a “home 
of rest for generally trained non-European nurses”97 all accepted by South 
African courts as valid and not contravening public policy.  These 
findings undoubtedly resulted from South African law’s (and courts’) 
                                                 
 91. Id. 
 92. 1971 (4) SA 549 (D) 554A-B. 
 93. See also Marks v. Estate Gluckman 1946 AD 289, 302-307, 311. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Ex parte Robinson 1953 2 SA 430 (C). 
 96. Ex parte Marriott 1960 1 SA 814 (D). 
 97. Ex parte Estate Impey 1963 1 SA 740 (C). 
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high regard for freedom of testation and the subjective considerations, 
even caprices, that frequently underpin testamentary dispositions.98 
 Significant, though, is the emergence of a more objective, 
normative approach to discriminatory testamentary bequests in the 
period immediately preceding full democratic constitutionalization in 
South Africa.  The leading judgment in this regard is Ex parte President 
of the Conference of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa:  In re 
William Marsh Will Trust99 in which article 13 of the Trust Property 
Control Act was used to delete the word “white” from testamentary 
charitable trust provisions that instructed the establishment of a home for 
destitute white children only.  The court ruled regarding the article’s 
public interest criterion that it would be in the public interest not to 
confine entry to the homes, several of which were created in 
consequence of the trust bequest, to white children only, but to open the 
homes to destitute children regardless of their ethnological 
characteristics.100  The William Marsh judgment was typified at the time 
as illustrative of the new direction taken by South African courts as it 
relates to human rights and the courts’ contribution to the then-emerging 
human rights culture in South Africa.101 
 Clearly, in a case such as William Marsh, the emergence of 
constitutionalism and the consequent rise in prominence of the non-
discrimination norm in South Africa during the early 1990s made some 
inroads into testamentary freedom and the subjectivities associated with 
the traditional approach to freedom of testation that centred on the 
recognition and protection, through law, of the personal autonomy and 
individualism of testators.  What would be the position once the 
constitutionalization process and the establishment of a human rights 
culture came to fruition; where would South African courts’ treatment of 
discriminatory testamentary bequests fit into the spectrum of Common 
Law opinion on the tenability of discrimination in gifts and trusts; and to 
what extent would South African courts adhere, in their treatment of the 
matter, to the Civilian-Roman-Dutch tradition of the South African 
common law? 
                                                 
 98. FRANÇOIS DU TOIT, SOUTH AFRICAN TRUST LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 33 (2d ed. 
2007). 
 99. 1993 (2) SA 697 (C). 
 100. Id. at 703H-J. 
 101. S. Nadasen & S. Pather, The South African Reality and the Creation of a Human 
Rights Culture, 6 STELL. L. REV. 256 (1995). 
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C. Discriminatory Testamentary Bequests in the Post-Constitutional 
Era 
 South African courts acknowledge readily that, since the advent of 
the constitutional era, public policy is rooted in the South African 
Constitution and the fundamental values it enshrines, thus establishing an 
objective, normative value system against which public policy matters 
must be resolved.102  The Constitutional Court stated emphatically that 
“the normative influence of the Constitution must be felt throughout the 
common law;”103 therefore, courts applying and developing the common 
law must do so through the infusion of the common law with 
constitutional values such as human dignity, equality and freedom.  In 
this light and given the dynamic nature of public policy, South African 
courts held that present-day public policy notions, informed by 
constitutional imperatives, must be applied even when dealing with wills 
executed decades earlier at times when different policy considerations 
held sway.104  This is not a novel approach in South African law and 
corresponds with the position taken in the pre-constitutional era by the 
Appellate Division in respect of contracts when it ruled that questions of 
public policy must be determined with reference to the time a court is 
requested to enforce or implement a contract’s provisions, not the time of 
the contract’s conclusion.105  Of course, this approach is aligned to that 
taken in the Canada Trust case and supported by Harding106 who argues 
that “contemporary values may be applied to old instruments to impugn 
dispositions on grounds of public policy.” 
 The normative stance taken by South African courts to public policy 
questions in wills in the post-constitutional era notwithstanding, the High 
Court recognized in its very first judgment on the matter107 that a balance 
must be struck between the non-discrimination norm, on the one hand, 
and freedom of testation, on the other; particularly in light of the implicit 
guarantee of testamentary freedom in the Bill of Rights’ property 
clause.108  To this end, the court in Syfrets Trust 109 held that not all clauses 
in wills or trust deeds that differentiate between different groups of 
                                                 
 102. Minister of Educ. v. Syfrets Trust Ltd. 2006 (4) SA 205 (C), § 24; Ex parte BOE Trust 
Ltd. 2009 (6) SA 470 (WCC), § 12. 
 103. NK v. Minister of Safety & Sec. 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) § 17. 
 104. Minister of Educ. v. Syfrets Trust Ltd. 2006 (4) SA 205 (C), § 26; Ex parte BOE Trust 
Ltd. 2009 (6) SA 470 (WCC), § 12. 
 105. Magna Alloys & Research SA (Pty.) Ltd. v. Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A). 
 106. Harding, supra note 2, at 314. 
 107. Minister of Educ. v. Syfrets Trust Ltd. 2006 (4) SA 205 (C). 
 108. See Part IV.A above. 
 109. Minister of Educ. v. Syfrets Trust Ltd. 2006 (4) SA 205 (C), § 48. 
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people are invalid; only those that effect unfair discrimination on grounds 
such as race, gender and religion will fall foul of the non-discrimination 
imperative.  How is the fairness or unfairness of discrimination 
established for this purpose? As indicated earlier,110 the South African 
Constitution’s equality clause directs that discrimination on any one or 
more of the grounds stated in article 9(2) of the Bill of Rights is unfair 
unless it is established that the discrimination is in fact fair.  In Harksen v. 
Lane111 the Constitutional Court distilled three criteria to guide the 
inquiry into fairness: 
i. Does the contested conduct differentiate between people or categories 
of people? If so, does the differentiation bear a rational connection to 
a legitimate purpose? If it does not, the conduct violates the Bill of 
Rights’ non-discrimination directive.  However, even if the conduct 
bears a rational connection, it may nevertheless amount to unfair 
discrimination. 
ii. Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This 
question demands a two-stage analysis: 
 First, does the differentiation amount to discrimination? If 
differentiation occurred on one of the grounds specified in the 
equality clause, then discrimination will have been established.  If it 
did not occur on one of the specified grounds, then whether or not 
there is discrimination will depend on whether, objectively, the 
ground is based upon attributes and characteristics that have the 
potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of persons or to 
affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner. 
 Secondly, if the differentiation amounts to discrimination in the 
aforementioned sense, does it amount to unfair discrimination? If the 
discrimination occurred on a specified ground, unfairness is 
presumed.  If on an unspecified ground, the complainant must 
establish unfairness.  The test in this regard focuses primarily on the 
impact of the discrimination on the complainant and others similarly 
situated. 
iii. If discrimination is found to be unfair, a determination must be made 
as to whether justification can be found under the Bill of Rights’ 
limitation clause. 
 Based on the aforementioned analysis, the court in Syfrets Trust 
held that a bursary bequest, made under a charitable trust established in 
terms of a will executed in 1920, amounted to direct and indirect unfair 
discrimination insofar as it limited bursary recipients to students “of 
European descent only” and excluded expressly “persons of Jewish 
                                                 
 110. See Part IV.A above. 
 111. 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) § 53. 
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decent [sic], and females of all nationalities.”112  To this end, the court 
noted the following important considerations:  those excluded from 
bursaries form part of so-called “previously disadvantaged groups” 
(under the apartheid dispensation) and the bursary bequest perpetuated 
the marginalisation of these groups;113 the bequest ran contrary to 
national legislation and international conventions against unfair 
discrimination;114 a finding in favour of amendment of the testamentary 
trust provisions in casu would be in line with the outcome in the earlier 
judgment in William Marsh ; 115 the university whose students were to 
benefit from the bursary bequest refused to administer the bursary 
scheme under discriminatory testamentary direction;116 and, finally, the 
equality rights of those excluded from eligibility for the bursaries 
outweigh, in a constitutional balancing exercise, the testator’s right to 
private property and the free testamentary disposition thereof.117  The 
court added to the foregoing that an “element of State action” is present 
in the scenario at hand insofar as a university is “a public agency or 
quasi-public body” and, moreover, that “a trust, though usually created by 
a private individual or group, is an institution of public concern.”118 
 In BOE Trust119 the court, although following the same reasoning, 
arrived at a different conclusion, albeit obiter dictum.  In casu the trustee 
of a testamentary charitable trust applied for the deletion of the word 
“White” from a bursary bequest, made under a charitable trust 
established in terms of a will executed in 2002, that provided bursaries to 
“White South African students” in possession of “an MSc degree in 
Organic Chemistry at a South African University” towards doctoral 
studies at a European or British university; the selection of the bursary 
recipients had to be effected by “the four Organic Chemistry Professors” 
at four stipulated South African universities.  Noteworthy is the proviso 
to the bursary bequest that bursary recipients had to “return to South 
Africa for a period to be stipulated by the Professors listed.”120  The 
applicant, having obtained confirmation from the four universities 
mentioned that they will decline participation in the selection of bursary 
candidates unless the bursaries were open to students of all races, argued 
                                                 
 112. Minister of Educ. v. Syfrets Trust Ltd. 2006 (4) SA 205 (C), § 1. 
 113. Id. § 34. 
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 116. Syfrets Trust, § 34. 
 117. Id. §§ 39-44. 
 118. Id. §§ 45-46. 
 119. Ex parte BOE Trust Ltd. 2009 (6) SA 470 (WCC). 
 120. Id. § 2. 
 
 
 
 
120 TULANE EUROPEAN & CIVIL LAW FORUM [Vol. 27 
 
that the bursary bequest, bearing reference to race or colour as a criterion 
for the selection of bursary recipients, was “directly or indirectly 
discriminatory against potential beneficiaries of the bursaries.”121 
 The court decided the matter in terms of article 13 of the Trust 
Property Control Act and denied the application by reason of the absence 
of the jurisdictional fact required for the article’s operation on the facts at 
hand—no circumstances unforeseen by the trust founder at the time of 
the will’s execution prevented implementation of the bursary bequest.122  
The court, nevertheless, touched briefly upon the public policy and 
constitutional considerations at play in casu.  The court acknowledged 
that modern-day public policy notions in South Africa are shaped by the 
South African Constitution.123  It next opined that the bursary bequest did 
not run contrary to public policy because, although it excluded non-white 
students as possible bursary recipients on the basis of race, the 
discrimination thus occasioned was not unfair insofar as the testatrix 
sought to achieve, through the bursary bequest’s proviso that bursary 
recipients must return to South Africa after the period spent at a 
university abroad, the legitimate purpose of retaining white scholarly 
expertise for South Africa and, in so doing, of countering the “brain 
drain” occasioned by the exodus of white South African graduates.  The 
court opined that, to this end, the testatrix was entitled fully, in the 
exercise of freedom of testation, to benefit a particular class of persons to 
the exclusion of others.124  What bolstered the court’s view on the matter 
was the fact that, given that public policy is prone to change over time, 
the will at hand was executed in 2002—well into South Africa’s 
democratic constitutional dispensation.  The changes in public policy that 
affected the will in Syfrets Trust, which will was executed some seventy 
years prior to the constitutional democratization in South Africa, did, 
therefore, not affect commensurately the will in BOE Trust.125 
 Two further judgments—both on bursary bequests—followed.  In 
both these judgments the courts utilized article 13 of the Trust Property 
Control Act, rather than the common law public policy yardstick, to 
effect amendments to testamentary charitable trusts, but the courts’ 
opinions on article 13’s public interest criterion are nevertheless 
insightful.  In Curators, Emma Smith Educational Fund v. University of 
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KwaZulu-Natal126 the Supreme Court of Appeal had to adjudicate on a 
testamentary charitable trust, the Emma Smith Educational Fund, created 
under a will executed in 1938, that instructed the University to “apply the 
income thereof in and towards the higher education of European girls 
born of British South African or Dutch South African parents.”127  
Moreover, the University was enjoined with the discretion to use the trust 
income, inter alia, “in the maintenance of Exhibitions for the benefit of 
poor girls who but for such assistance would be unable to pursue their 
studies.”128  The applicant in the court a quo129 prayed the variation of the 
provisions of the trust through, inter alia, the deletion of the words 
“European,” “British” and “or Dutch South African.”130 
 The court a quo allowed the variation sought by the applicants 
under the Trust Property Control Act.  Having established article 13’s 
jurisdictional fact, the court reasoned, given the centrality of race in the 
matter at hand, that the present case was indistinguishable from those in 
William Marsh and Syfrets Trust; it reasoned, therefore, that, because it 
could not be persuaded that the aforementioned two decisions were 
wrongly decided, it was bound by them and, consequently, that “it is in 
the public interest that the relief sought in the notice of motion be 
granted.”131 
 The curators ad litem for potential beneficiaries under the trust took 
the matter on appeal before the Supreme Court of Appeal (formerly the 
Appellate Division).132  The appeal court, in addressing the issue of the 
will’s racially exclusive restriction in terms of article 13 of the Trust 
Property Control Act, proceeded directly—without, in my opinion, 
having explicit and comprehensive regard to the section’s jurisdictional 
fact—to an inquiry on whether such restriction contravened public policy 
imperatives and, therefore, was in conflict with the public interest (and, 
hence, variable) in accordance with the article.  To this end, the court 
placed due reliance on Syfrets Trust in that testamentary trust provisions 
that occasion unfair discrimination run contrary to public policy 
(curiously, the court did not refer to BOE Trust at all).  It reasoned that in 
the public sphere racially discriminatory testamentary dispositions would 
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not pass constitutional muster;133 public policy is rooted in the 
Constitution and the fundamental values it enshrines;134 the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal is a higher education institution and is obliged to apply 
public policy;135 and the racially restrictive nature of the Emma Smith 
Educational Fund prevented realization of the testator’s intentions and 
was, moreover, in conflict with the public interest.136 
 In light of the foregoing, the appeal court found that the court a quo 
correctly decided to remove the racially restrictive prescripts from the 
testator’s will.137  In reaching this conclusion, the court echoed the view 
espoused in Canada Trust138 that its ruling in casu, being confined to 
public charitable trusts, will not impact negatively on future private 
educational bequests,139 nor does it undermine the fundamental principle 
of testamentary freedom.140  Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal 
against the court a quo’s deletion of the words “European,” “British” and 
“or Dutch South African” from the testator’s will.141 
 The Syfrets Trust and Emma Smith judgments indicate that South 
African testators venture onto precarious ground should they base 
restrictive testamentary bequests on race, colour or ethnic origin.  Given 
South Africa’s racially divided past, the position taken by South African 
courts on race-based clauses, is, arguably, understandable.  But what 
about restrictive clauses based on other grounds specified in the South 
African Constitution’s equality clause?  In Syfrets Trust the court excised 
a gender-based restriction from the trust at hand.  More recently, in Board 
of Executors v. Benjamin Godlieb Heydenrych Testamentary Trust, 
George King Testamentary Trust, Cyril Houghton Bursary Trust, 
Women’s Legal Centre (Amicus Curiae),142 the High Court had the 
opportunity to adjudicate on restrictive clauses where educational trust 
benefits were limited explicitly on the grounds of race and gender.  The 
trusts’ trustee sought the removal of the racial restrictions but advocated a 
more lenient approach to the gender limitations, whereupon the amicus 
curiae petitioned for the removal of the gender-based restrictions from 
the two affected trusts.  The bequests to which the applicants objected 
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were, in regard to the Heydenrych Trust (created in terms of a will 
executed in 1943), that only European boys, at least one half of which 
shall be of British descent, will be educated through awards from the 
trust; in regard to the Houghton Trust (created in terms of a will executed 
in 1989), that only boys who are members of the white population group 
may receive educational bursaries under the trust; and, in regard to the 
George King Trust (created in terms of a will executed in 1987), that only 
members of the white population group qualify as bursary recipients 
under the trust. 
 The court disposed quickly with the racial limitations—for the 
reasons advanced in the Syfrets Trust and Emma Smith cases the race-
based restrictions were found to contravene public policy and fell to be 
deleted in terms of article 13 of the Trust Property Control Act.143  In 
regard to the gender-based restrictions of the Heydenrych and Houghton 
Trusts, the trustee, in an argument that could equally have been made 
before a Dutch court in a contest of a discriminatory bequest under 
article 4:44 of the Dutch Civil Code, proposed that the testators 
concerned were not motivated by sexism when they limited bursary 
eligibility to males, but by other, unknown reasons.  The trustee argued, 
therefore, that the testators’ decisions to impose gender restrictions on 
bursary recipients were of a subjective, personal nature and that their 
discriminatory treatment of females should be treated more 
circumspectly.144  The court, with reliance on Harksen v. Lane, ruled, 
however, that limiting educational bursaries to boys, particularly in 
circumstances where the educational institution in question is co-
educational, meets the constitutional unfair discrimination test145 and, 
moreover, falls foul of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 insofar as the Act enumerates as an 
unfair practice “[u]nfairly withholding scholarships, bursaries, or any 
form of assistance from learners of particular groups identified by the 
prohibited groups.”146  Furthermore, the South African Constitutional 
Court affirmed that proof of an intention to discriminate is not required 
in order to show unfair discrimination.147  In light of the foregoing, the 
court ordered the variation of the wills that contained gender-based 
limitations by including also females as eligible bursary recipients.148 
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D. Evaluation 
 South African courts opted for a distinct normative approach to 
discriminatory testamentary charitable bequests in the post-constitutional 
era.  The South African Constitution, and particularly the equality and 
non-discrimination imperatives of its Bill of Rights, provides the lens 
through which courts now view public policy questions in regard to such 
bequests.  This approach is typified by the general objectivity with which 
the public policy yardstick is applied and a consequent move away from 
inquiries into testators’ intention, motive or purpose that, when apposite, 
traditionally formed part of the inquiry when the limitation of freedom of 
testation in terms of public policy was at issue.  This approach is, 
arguably, understandable in light of the constitutional paradigm in which 
South African courts function since the mid-1990s, coupled with the Bill 
of Rights’ explicit directive in regard to judicial harmonization of the 
common law with the constitutional imperatives of human dignity, 
equality and freedom. 
 But has South African courts moved so firmly into the normative, 
non-discrimination fold, advocated by Common Law lawyers such as 
Harding as well as Grattan and Conway, that they have forsaken 
altogether the subjective considerations, noted by Civil lawyers such as 
Kolkman as well as Luijten and Meijer, pertinent to testators’ dispository 
plans? A careful reading of the South African judgments discussed above 
reveals that testamentary intent, motive or purpose still have a role to 
play to temper the rigidity that could result from an objective, normative, 
strictly policy-based approach to the limitation of freedom of testation in 
regard to discriminatory gifts and trusts. 
 Noteworthy is the Syfrets Trust court’s observation regarding its 
finding in casu: 
This conclusion does not, of course, mean that the principle of freedom of 
testation is being negated or ignored; it simply enforces a limitation on the 
testator’s freedom of testation that has existed since time immemorial.  It 
also does not mean that all clauses in wills or trust deeds that differentiate 
between different groups of people are invalid; simply that the present 
conditions—which discriminate unfairly on the grounds of race, gender 
and religion—are invalid.149 
 The first sentence of the above dictum places the matter squarely 
within the legal-historical context of South Africa’s Romanist-Civilian 
common law.  I submit, in other words, that it permits the consideration 
of an evolved public policy yardstick, rooted not only in 
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constitutionalism and human rights, but also in, particularly, the tenets of 
Roman-Dutch law’s limitation of testamentary freedom by the good 
morals.  The passage’s second sentence makes it explicit that South 
African testators still enjoy the freedom to accommodate differentiation 
in their dispository plans, as long as it does not occasion unfair 
discrimination in constitutional terms.  Unsurprisingly, therefore, the 
court in BOE Trust affirmed: 
[N]ot all clauses in wills or trust instruments which differentiate between 
different classes of beneficiary are invalid.  Given that no one has a right to 
receive a benefit under a will or trust, it seems to me that, in principle, the 
freedom of testation must include the right to benefit a particular class of 
persons, and not others.  Only where that conduct can be categorised as 
unfair discrimination should it be held contrary to public policy.150 
 Sceptics may view such statements as nothing more than empty 
pro-freedom-of-testation rhetoric to appease those who fear large-scale 
judicial intervention in testamentary dispositions.  They’ll no doubt argue 
that the true value of freedom of testation comes to the fore when the 
testamentary dispositions of those who hold non-conforming views are 
safeguarded on par with those whose dispositions conform to prevailing 
societal norms.  For example, Leslie151 cautions against a scenario where 
freedom of testation exists for the majority of testators who happen to 
have the same sense of duty and moral obligation that the law implicitly 
imposes, but not for those testators who ascribe to non-conforming 
values.  In similar vein, Spivack152 argues that the principle of 
testamentary freedom is not necessary to protect conventional bequests; 
rather it exists to carry out devices that fail to conform to social norms 
yet reflect a testator’s will.  In this light, the judgment in BOE Trust  is 
significant insofar as it is a post-constitutional case in which a South 
African court found, albeit obiter, that a race-based restriction in a 
testamentary charitable trust did not contravene public policy.  The court 
reasoned: 
During the post-constitutional years much has been said and written about 
the increasing trend amongst white graduates of our universities to 
emigrate, upon completion of their education, thereby depriving the 
country of [the] benefit of their skills obtained at the expense of the South 
African tertiary-education system . . . .  The testatrix has thought fit to 
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require beneficiaries of the bursary trust to return to South Africa for a 
period determined by the universities concerned, after obtaining their 
doctorates.  It seems at least possible that, in so doing, she was seeking to 
ameliorate this skills loss and, indeed, to promote importation of skills 
obtained overseas.  Certainly, it seems to me that the implementation of the 
bequest in accordance with its terms would have that effect.153 
 This passage focuses pertinently on the testatrix’s motive or purpose 
with the racial limitation and, although the court’s deductions in this 
regard appear somewhat flimsy (based by and large on anecdotal 
evidence), it nevertheless confirms that testamentary intent, motive or 
purpose, even of the seemingly non-conforming variety, can swing the 
balance of the unfair discrimination inquiry in favour of testamentary 
freedom and away from its limitation on the ground of public policy. 
 The cases discussed above paved the way for future South African 
courts to be steadfastly normative, with a pertinent focus on the non-
discrimination norm, in their application of public policy to inheritance 
issues, but to contextualize the distinction between fair and unfair 
discrimination with due regard to subjective considerations pertinent to 
the dispository plan on the merits of each case.  That not all 
discrimination in gifts and trusts is unconstitutional and unlawful, and 
that a casuistic approach to the adjudication of these matters, akin to that 
advocated by Colliton in the American context,154 is advised, appears also 
from the South African Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment in Emma 
Smith: 
The curators argued that the judicial amendment of a public charitable 
trust’s provisions would have a chilling effect upon future private 
educational bequests.  I cannot agree.  We are not called upon to decide the 
case of a testator who is a member of a congregation wishing to create a 
trust for members of his or her faith or a club member intending to benefit 
the children of fellow members.155 
 This passage permits of the interpretation that adjudication of 
“private bequests” of the kind to which the court referred—regardless of 
the tenability of the public-private-divide—may well introduce additional 
or different, typically subjective, testator-centred considerations to the 
unfair discrimination discourse; factors that may tip the balance of the 
unfair discrimination inquiry in favour of testamentary freedom and 
away from its limitation on the ground of public policy. 
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 This is not to say that testamentary motive or purpose will 
necessarily trump non-discrimination imperatives, even if such motive or 
purpose is entirely laudable and rationally connected to a legitimate 
purpose.156  This assertion is illustrated by the Roman-Dutch approach to 
religion-based testamentary forfeiture clauses.  In Aronson157 Van den 
Heever JA purported to analyse the matter comprehensively in 
addressing the challenge to the “Jewish faith and race clause” included in 
the testator’s will.  The judge referred to Savigny158 who questioned 
whether the most intimate concern of a human being, to alter one’s 
religion or to adhere to it, should be influenced by loss or gain.  Savigny 
argued that, in accordance with the principles of Roman law, such a 
condition should be treated as immoral; moreover, that it renders 
unconditional the testamentary disposition to which it is attached.159  Van 
den Heever JA was unconvinced by this argument and found the 
reasoning “demonstrably fallacious.”160  The judge conceded, however, 
that, whenever a testamentary condition was remitted in Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law, it was on the ground that to uphold the condition 
would be “to abet immorality or to induce that which is contrary to 
public policy.”161  He stated: 
If I bequeath an annuity to a person suffering from tuberculosis on 
condition that he resides in a certain place where the climate is known to be 
gentle to such sufferers, my motives may be most laudable and 
enforcement of the condition may be in the best interests of the annuitant.  
Yet the condition was remitted (D.  35.1.71.2).  It is clear, therefore, that the 
jurist must have applied an objective standard:  it is contrary to public 
policy that a free man should by a condition in a legacy be reduced in status 
to that of a colonus glebae adscriptus . . . .  To seem to reduce his status is 
an infringement of his dignitas.162 
 This notwithstanding, Van den Heever JA concluded that Roman-
Dutch law did not evince a consistent standpoint against Jewish clauses 
on normative grounds and, like his brother Greenberg JA,163 opined that 
“[t]here is nothing immoral or against public policy against a Jew 
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remaining true to the faith of his fathers and a condition that he shall not 
marry a person of another religion is conducive to harmonious and happy 
marriages.”164 
 Joubert,165 in a comprehensive scholarly critique of Van den Heever 
JA’s judgment published almost two decades later, notes the references by 
two writers to judgments handed down by Dutch courts during the time 
of the Dutch Republic (1581-1795) when Roman-Dutch law was 
established.  First, Van der Linden166 commented on a decision in which 
the Court of Holland, on 20 September 1775, ruled against the validity of 
a testamentary condition that contained a Jewish faith and race clause.  
Van der Linden notes that a principal reason, among others, for the 
decision is to be found in the rule of natural law assimilated into the 
Dutch common law that “niemand tot het omhelzen of verlaten eener 
Religie moet gedwongen worden” (no-one must be coerced to embrace 
or to forsake a religion).167  Secondly, Pauw168 notes a judgment by the 
Hoge Raad (the Supreme Court of the Netherlands or High Council) 
handed down on 13 December 1747 in which a testamentary condition 
that contained a Jewish faith clause was held pro non scripto.  According 
to Joubert, the Hoge Raad’s decision was founded on the principle of 
freedom of religion—it was found to be scandalous and, therefore, 
unlawful, to compel a person to continue to profess a faith, or not to 
convert to another faith (or, for that matter, to deprive such person of the 
right to hold no faith at all) by making a testamentary bequest to such 
person subject to such a condition.169  Joubert concludes, therefore, that, 
in light of this Roman-Dutch authority, South African courts can 
invalidate faith and race clauses in wills insofar as they seek to compel 
beneficiaries to profess a given religion, and to do so on the ground that 
such clauses conflict with the fundamental (now constitutionally 
guaranteed170) principle of freedom of religion.171 
 To Joubert’s exposition can be added Van Oosten’s172 mention of an 
account by the Roman-Dutch writer Cornelis van Bijnkershoek (1673-
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1743) of a Frenchman who bequeathed to his daughter, who adhered to 
the Reformed religion and who fled to England, a certain monetary sum 
on condition that the daughter returns to France and converts to 
Catholicism.  The question arose whether or not this condition must be 
held pro non scripto, to which the courts of first and second instance 
answered in the affirmative, but the Hoge Raad was not called upon to 
decide. 
 In light of the above authority, Van den Heever JA’s view, 
purportedly expressing the Roman-Dutch position, on the tenability of a 
Jewish faith and race clause is puzzling and certainly contestable.  
However, Aronson v. Estate Hart is a decision by the South African 
Appellate Division and the system of precedent that binds South African 
courts to existing judgments may well prevent courts to depart from 
Aronson on the ground that it stated the common law incorrectly.  
However, a South African court in the post-constitutional era can invoke 
the Bill of Rights’ equality and non-discrimination directives to overturn 
the Aronson court’s finding on normative grounds by following the 
reasoning in Syfrets Trust, Emma Smith and Benjamin Godlieb 
Heydenrych Testamentary Trust—such an outcome would certainly be 
aligned to the normative stance taken in the Roman-Dutch jurisprudence 
referenced by Joubert and Van Oosten.173 
 At this juncture, however, a caution:  a robustly normative approach 
to discriminatory bequests holds a particular danger to which the Syfrets 
Trust court fell prey.  The court set its view so firmly on realizing the 
non-discrimination norm that it applied incorrectly an important 
common law inheritance rule.  In casu the limitation of trust benefits to 
students of European descent appeared in clause 4(d) of the will and the 
exclusion of students of Jewish descent and female students was 
contained in a codicil added to the will some eight months later.  As 
indicated earlier,174 the court ruled that these provisions occasioned unfair 
discrimination and, as such, were, in terms of the common law, contrary 
to public policy.  The appropriate common law remedy, derived from 
Roman-Dutch law, in such a case is to strike out the offending provision, 
if it is severable from the rest of the disposition, failing which the whole 
of the disposition must be set aside.  Given South African law’s non-
variation rule in regard to testamentary provisions,175 a finding that a 
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testamentary provision is contrary to public policy does not per se give a 
court the power to vary the provision as it thinks appropriate.176 
 What order did the court give in Syfrets Trust?   It ordered the 
deletion of the words “but of European descent only” from clause 4(d) of 
the will and the striking-out of the entire codicil bearing reference to 
Jewish descent and females.177  The court, therefore, struck out the codicil 
as a provision severable from the remainder of the bursary bequest 
because it offended public policy and, on the same ground, removed 
certain words from clause 4(d) of the will.  I submit that the former 
constitutes a competent exercise of a South African court’s common law 
power of variation of testamentary provisions, but that the latter is 
impermissible in terms of the non-variation rule because, rather than a 
striking-out of a severable provision, it amounts to a re-writing of the 
testator’s will through a selective excision of words from a testamentary 
provision—doing so exceeds the parameters of a South African court’s 
common law interventionist power regarding a testamentary provision 
that conflicts with public policy. 
 Admittedly, this standpoint begs the question whether the Syfrets 
Trust court could have made a different order—striking-out the severable 
codicil but leaving clause 4(d) of the will unaltered would have 
occasioned an absurd result because the racially discriminatory 
restriction on the bursaries would be retained.  The solution to this 
problem lies in South African courts’ mandate under article 8 of the 
Constitution, particularly the directive in article 8(3) to develop rules of 
the common law to limit a constitutionally protected right such as 
freedom of testation.  I submit that it would have been competent, indeed 
necessary, for the Syfrets Trust court to invoke explicitly article 8(3) to 
escape the strictures of the common law non-variation rule by 
broadening its power of variation of testamentary provisions to include 
the selective excising of words from a testamentary bequest when such is 
required to eliminate unfair discrimination and to leave the bequest 
operationally free from discriminatory restrictions.  This the Syfrets court 
failed to do and, as it stands, exceeded, without providing a proper legal 
basis for doing so, its common law power of variation in respect of the 
order it made regarding clause 4(d) of the testator’s will.  The Syfrets 
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court’s error sounds a warning to particularly the proponents of 
elimination of all discrimination from gifts and trusts that the normative 
demands of constitutionalism and/or public policy in regard to 
testamentary dispositions should not be met at the expense of adherence 
to basic inheritance law principles. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 South African courts’ treatment of discriminatory testamentary 
bequests in the post-constitutional era appears to be a good fit between 
the predominantly normative paradigm of the Common Law and the 
slightly more testator-centred approach evident in a Civilian jurisdiction 
such as the Netherlands.  In a sense, South African courts have been 
fortunate insofar as all the post-constitutional cases on discriminatory 
bequests concerned educational trusts and the courts, rightly or wrongly, 
cottoned on to the public side of the public-private-divide in regard to 
these bequests evident from comparable Common Law jurisprudence.  
Nevertheless, there seems room for a normative stance through the use of 
an evolved, though historically contextualized, public policy yardstick in 
regard to purely private bequests—and Roman-Dutch law provides vital 
authority on this point—that will enable South African courts to also 
hold private bequests to the non-discrimination norm, but to permit some 
subjectivity into the inquiry through the test for unfairness of 
discrimination and consideration of whether the testator intended the 
dispository plan to serve a legitimate purpose. 
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